Restricting Access to FPGA Probe Points - Restricting Access to FPGA Probe Points - XAPP1098

Developing Tamper-Resistant Designs with UltraScale and UltraScale+ FPGAs (XAPP1098)

Document ID
XAPP1098
Release Date
2025-05-22
Revision
1.5.1 English

Making it difficult for an attacker to get near the FPGA is a good example of a layered approach. A robust tamper boundary (perhaps with tamper detect switches) can be used around any device(s) that might contain CT. For example, an activated tamper switch could cause a shunt to go active on the FPGA’s VBATT line. Buried vias and routing can be used on the printed circuit board for FPGA signals, power supply routing can be kept within buried layers (and difficult to get to), and adequate decoupling can be used (buried capacitance technology should be used, if possible). JTAG boundary-scan techniques can be relied on for board-level factory testing, and test points should be removed from production boards. For more information, refer to the UltraFast Design Methodology Guide for FPGAs and SoCs (UG949).