Secure Boot Flow - 2025.1 English - UG1304

Versal Adaptive SoC System Software Developers Guide (Versal AI Edge Series Gen 2 and Versal Prime Series Gen 2) (UG1304)

Document ID
UG1304
Release Date
2025-06-23
Version
2025.1 English

This chapter describes the secure boot features. The adaptive SoC supports two secure boot modes: Asymmetric Hardware Root of Trust (A-HWRoT) and Symmetric Hardware Root of Trust (S-HWRoT). The A-HWRoT achieves authenticity of the boot image using asymmetric authentication algorithms (RSA, LMS, or ECC). The A-HWRoT can optionally be combined with encryption to achieve confidentiality. The S-HWRoT achieves authenticity, confidentiality, and integrity of the boot image using symmetric means via the GCM mode of AES-256 by encrypting all portions of the boot and configuration files (excluding the boot header). A-HWRoT and S-HWRoT can be optionally enabled together to obtain the benefits of both.

Note: The Versal device allows for two methods to protect its secret symmetric keys from differential power analysis (DPA): protocol and built-in hardware masking. Each method can be used individually or together to create enhanced protection.

The functional blocks in a secure boot process are:

  • Dedicated hardware state machines in the PMC
  • PMC ROM code unit (RCU)
  • PMC Platform processing unit (PPU)

After boot the application security unit (ASU) provides security services for the RPU, APU, and soft processors running in the PL.

The following figure shows the high-level boot flow summary.

Figure 1. High-Level Secure Boot Flow Summary

After the power is applied to the device, the dedicated hardware state machines perform a series of mandatory tasks. First, all test interfaces (for example, JTAG) initialize to a known secure state. Second, all registers in the PMC are zeroized (reset + verification of reset state). Before execution of the PMC BootROM, the dedicated hardware hashes the immutable BootROM code using the SHA-3/384 engine and compares the calculated cryptographic hash against a golden copy stored in the device. If the hashes match, the integrity of the BootROM is validated, and the PMC RCU is released from reset. If the hash comparison fails, the device goes into a secure lockdown state.

Once released, the PMC RCU becomes the center of the secure boot process. It is responsible for all mandatory and optional security operations, as well as the secure loading of the PLM. A list of all security checks at this phase are listed in the following table. Optional checks are enabled by programming eFUSEs.

Table 1. Security Checks
Security Operation Description Optional?
Zeroize PMC RAM The PMC RAM is overwritten and read back to confirm the write was successful No
User-defined environmental monitoring Temperature and voltage are monitored to ensure operation within user-defined limits Yes
Known answer tests Known answer tests are performed on the cryptographic engines used for loading the PLM prior to them being used Yes
NoC configuration (SSI technology devices only) Configuration of the NoC on SSI technology devices No

The RCU also enforces the secure boot modes (A-HWRoT or S-HWRoT), if enabled. Once a device is configured in A-HWRoT or S-HWRoT boot mode, you cannot go back to an unsecure boot mode.

The PLM runtime configuration registers area (RTCA) is a reserved space in the PMC RAM that stores status information about the Versal adaptive SoC including the secure boot state. The SECURE_BOOT_STATE register shows if the device was booted with encryption or authentication and what secure countermeasures were enabled.